Good data stewardship requires removal of data at the request of the data's owner. This raises the question if and how a trained machine-learning model, which implicitly stores information about its training data, should be affected by such a removal request. Is it possible to "remove" data from a machine-learning model? We study this problem by defining certified removal : a very strong theoretical guarantee that a model from which data is removed cannot be distinguished from a model that never observed the data to begin with. We develop a certifiedremoval mechanism for linear classifiers and empirically study learning settings in which this mechanism is practical.
INTRODUCTION
Machine-learning models are often trained on thirdparty data, for example, many computer-vision models are trained on images provided by Flickr users (Thomee et al., 2016) . When a party requests that their data be removed from such online platforms, this raises the question how such a request should impact models that were trained prior to the removal. A similar question arises when a model is negatively impacted by a data-poisoning attack (Biggio et al., 2012) . Is it possible to "remove" data from a model without re-training that model from scratch?
We study this question in a framework we call certified removal, which theoretically guarantees that an adversary cannot extract information about training data that was removed from a model. Inspired by differential privacy (Dwork, 2011) , certified removal bounds the max-divergence between the outputs of the model from which the data was removed and the outputs of a model that never observed that data. This guarantees that membership-inference attacks (Yeom et al., 2018; Carlini et al., 2019) are unsuccessful on data that was removed from the model. We emphasize that certified removal is a very strong notion of removal; in practical applications, less constraining notions may equally fulfill the data owner's expectation of removal.
We develop a certified-removal mechanism for L 2regularized linear models that are trained using a differentiable convex loss function, e.g., logistic regressors. Our removal mechanism applies a Newton step on the model parameters that largely removes the influence of the deleted data point; the residual error of this mechanism decreases quadratically with the size of the training set. To ensure that an adversary cannot extract information from the small residual (i.e., to certify removal), we mask the residual using an approach that randomly perturbs the training loss (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) . We empirically study in which settings the removal mechanism is practical.
CERTIFIED REMOVAL
Let D be a fixed training dataset and let A be a (randomized) learning algorithm that trains on D and outputs a model h ∈ H, that is, A : D → H. Randomness in A induces a probability distribution over the models in the hypothesis set H. We would like to remove a training sample, x ∈ D, from the output of A.
To this end, we define a data-removal mechanism M that is applied to A(D) and aims to remove the influence of x. If removal is successful, the output of M should be difficult to distinguish from the output of A applied on D \ x. We say that removal mechanism M performs -certified removal for learning algorithm A if ∀T ⊆ H, D ⊆ X , x ∈ D:
This definition states that the ratio between the likelihood of (1) a model from which sample x was removed and (2) a model that was never trained on x to begin where D and D differ in only one sample. Since D and D \ x only differ in one sample, it is straightforward to see that differential privacy of A is a sufficient condition for certified removal, viz., by setting removal mechanism M to the identity function. Indeed, if algorithm A never memorizes the training data in the first place, we need not worry about removing that data.
Even though differential privacy is a sufficient condition, it is not a necessary condition for certified removal. For example, a nearest-neighbor classifier is not differentially private but it is trivial to certifiably remove a training sample in O(1) time with = 0. We note that differential privacy is a very strong condition, and most differentially private models suffer a significant loss in accuracy even for large (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Abadi et al., 2016) . We therefore view the study of certified removal as analyzing the trade-off between utility and removal efficiency, with re-training from scratch and differential privacy at the two ends of the spectrum, and removal in the middle.
REMOVAL MECHANISMS
We focus on certified removal from parametric models, as removal from non-parametric models (e.g., nearestneighbor classifiers) is trivial. We first study linear models with strongly convex regularization before proceeding to removal from deep networks.
Linear Classifiers
Denote by D = {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )} the training set of n samples, ∀i : x i ∈ R d , with corresponding targets y i . We assume learning algorithm A tries to minimize the regularized empirical risk of a linear model:
where (w x, y) is a convex loss that is differentiable everywhere. We denote w * = A(D) = argmin w L(w, D) as it is uniquely determined.
We assume without loss of generality that we aim to remove the last training sample, (x n , y n ). Specifically, we define an efficient removal mechanism that approximately minimizes L(·, D ) with D = D \ (x n , y n ). First, denote the loss gradient at sample (x n , y n ) by ∆ = λw * + ∇ ((w * ) x n , y n ) and the Hessian of L(·, D ) at w * by H w * = ∇ 2 L(w * , D ). We consider the Newton update removal mechanism M :
which is a one-step Newton update applied to the gradient influence of the removed point (x n , y n ). The update H −1 w * ∆ is also known as the influence function of the training point (x n , y n ) on the parameter vector w * (Cook and Weisberg, 1982; Koh and Liang, 2017) .
The computational cost of this Newton update is dominated by the cost of forming and inverting the Hessian matrix. The Hessian matrix for D can be formed offline with O(d 2 n) cost. The subsequent Hessian inversion makes the removal mechanism O(d 3 ) at removal time; the inversion can leverage efficient linear algebra libraries and GPUs.
Bounding the approximation error. As argued in Section 2, bounding the difference between w − and the minimizer for L(·, D ) is not sufficient for guaranteeing that w − is indistinguishable from training from scratch on D . However, we will show later on that by bounding the norm of the gradient ∇L(w − , D ) instead, we can design a suitable data removal mechanism that satisfies the -certified removal definition. To this end, we first present an asymptotic result on the gradient norm ∇L(w − , D ) 2 .
Theorem 1. Suppose that ∀(x i , y i ) ∈ D, w ∈ R d : ∇ (w x i , y i ) 2 ≤ C. Suppose also that is γ-Lipschitz and x i 2 ≤ 1 for all (x i , y i ) ∈ D. Then:
where H wη denotes the Hessian of L(·, D ) at the parameter vector w η = w * + ηH −1 w * ∆ for some η ∈ [0, 1].
Least-squares and logistic regression. Leastsquares and logistic regression are ubiquitous in applications of machine learning. Least-squares regression assumes ∀i : y i ∈ R and uses loss function:
The Hessian of this loss function is
which is independent of w, making it particularly suitable for certified removal. In particular, the gradient residual norm from Equation 4 is exactly zero, which makes the Newton update an -certified removal mechanism with = 0. This is not surprising since the Newton update assumes a local quadratic approximation of the loss, which is exact for least-squares regression.
Logistic regression assumes ∀i : y i ∈ {−1, +1} and uses the loss function:
(w x i , y i ) = − log σ y i w x i , where σ(·) denotes the sigmoid function. Its gradient and Hessian can be derived as:
Under the assumption that x i 2 ≤ 1 for all i, it is straightforward to show that ∇ (w x i , y i ) 2 ≤ 1 and (w x i , y i ) is (1/4)-Lipschitz. This allows us to apply Theorem 1 to logistic regression.
Loss perturbation. Obtaining a small gradient norm ∇L(w − , D ) 2 via Theorem 1 does not imply that we have achieved certified removal. In particular, the direction of the gradient residual may leak information about the training sample that was "removed".
To address this issue, we combine the Newton update in Equation 3 with the loss perturbation technique of Chaudhuri et al. (2011) that perturbs the empirical risk by a random linear term:
with b ∈ R d drawn randomly from some distribution. We analyze how loss perturbation masks the gradient residual ∇L(w − , D ).
Let A(D) be an exact minimizer 1 for L b (w) and let A(D) be an approximate minimizer of L b (w). Specifically, letw be an approximate solution produced bỹ A. This implies the gradient residual is:
with u 2 ≤ for some pre-specified bound .
Let f A (·) and fÃ(·) be the density functions over the model parameters produced by A andÃ, respectively. We bound the max-divergence between f A and fÃ for any solutionw produced byÃ.
Theorem 2. Suppose that b is drawn from a distribution with density function p(·) such that for any
for any solutionw produced byÃ.
Achieving -certified removal. Theorem 2 shows that if the removal mechanism has a gradient residual norm bound of , then by sampling b appropriately, approximate optimization of the loss function L b results in an -certified removal: the random perturbation of the empirical risk hides the information in the approximation performed by the removal mechanism.
In particular, we specialize this result to the situation where A performs a one-time sampling of the random vector b and optimizes the loss L b exactly. The noise vector b is discarded after optimization and is not observed by the adversary. The approximate optimizer A is formed by the data-removal mechanism in Equation 3, i.e.,Ã = M • A. Note that the Newton update remains the same for loss L b because the Hessian matrix H w * is unaffected by the linear term b w. The gradient residual bound is given by Theorem 1.
In this setting, the certified-removal (CR) security parameter depends on the distribution from which b is sampled. If b ∼ Laplace( / ) d then the removal mechanism in Equation 3 is -CR for A. If b ∼ N (0, c / ) d with c > 0 then the mechanism is ( , δ)-CR for A with failure probability δ = O(e −c 2 /2 ) (Dwork, 2011) .
Multiple removals. The worst-case gradient residual norm after T removals can be shown to scale linearly in T . We can prove this using induction on T . The base case, T = 1, is proven above. Suppose that the gradient residual after T ≥ 1 removals is u T with u T 2 ≤ T , where is the gradient residual norm bound for a single removal. Consider the modified loss function L (T ) b (w) = L b (w) − u T w and let w T be the approximate solution after T removals. Then w T is an exact solution of L (T ) b (w), hence, the argument above can be applied to L (T ) b (w) to show that the Newton update approximation w T +1 has gradient residual u with norm at most . Then:
Thus the gradient residual for L b (w) after T + 1 removals is u T +1 := u T + u and its norm is at most (T + 1) by the triangle inequality.
Batch removal. In certain scenarios, data removal may not need to occur immediately after the data's owner requests that removal. This potentially allows for batch removals in which multiple training samples are removed at once for improved efficiency. The Newton update removal mechanism naturally supports this extension. Assume without loss of generality that the batch of training data to be removed is D m = {(x n−m+1 , y n−m+1 ), . . . , (x n , y n )}. Define:
The batch removal update is:
We can show bounds on the approximation error similar to that of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 for the batch removal setting.
Theorem 3. Under the same regularity conditions of Theorem 1, we have that:
where X (−m) is the data matrix for D \ D m and γ is the Lipschitz constant of . Algorithm 2 Newton update removal mechanism. 1: Input: Dataset D, loss , parameters , δ, σ, λ > 0.
2:
Solution w computed by Algorithm 1.
3:
Online sequence of batches of training 4:
sample indices for removal:
11:
H ← i:i / ∈B1,B2,...,Bj ∇ 2 (w x i , y i ).
12:
X ← remove rows(X, B j ).
13:
K ← K − i∈Bj x i x i . 14: γ ← γ + K 2 · H −1 ∆ 2 · XH −1 ∆ 2 .
15:
if γ > σ /c then 16:
Re-train from scratch using Algorithm 1.
17:
else 18:
19:
end if 20: end for Reducing online computation. The Newton update requires forming and inverting the Hessian. Although the O(d 3 ) cost of inversion is relatively cheap for small d and can be done very efficiently on GPUs, the cost of forming the Hessian is O(d 2 n), which may be problematic for internet-scale datasets. However, forming the Hessian can be done offline, i.e., before the data to be removed is presented, and only the matrix inversion need to be computed online.
When computing the data-dependent bound, a similar technique can be used for calculating the term X − H −1 w * ∆ 2 -which involves the product of the (n − 1) × d data matrix X − with a d-dimensional vector. We can reduce the online component of this computation to O(d 3 ) by forming the SVD of X offline and applying online down-dates (Gu and Eisenstat, 1995) to form the SVD of X − by solving an eigendecomposition problem on a d × d matrix. It can be shown that this technique reduces the computation of X − H −1 w * ∆ 2 to involve only d × d matrices and ddimensional vectors, which enables the online computation cost to be independent of n.
Pseudo-code. We present pseudo-code for training removal-enabled models (Algorithm 1) and for the ( , δ)-CR Newton update mechanism (Algorithm 1). For training, any optimizer with convergence guarantee for strongly convex loss functions can be used to find the minimizer in Algorithm 1. We use L-BFGS (Liu and Nocedal, 1989) in our experiments as it was the most efficient of optimizers we tried.
Non-Linear Models
Deep learning models often apply a linear model to features extracted by a network pre-trained on a public dataset like ImageNet (Ren et al., 2015; He et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017; Carreira and Zisserman, 2017) for imaging, and a range of text classification tasks (Devlin et al., 2019; Dai et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019) for language. In this case, we only need to worry about data removal from the linear model. However, when feature extractors are trained on private data, our certified-removal mechanism can be used on linear models applied to a differentiallyprivate feature extraction network (Abadi et al., 2016) .
Theorem 4. Suppose Φ is a randomized learning algorithm that is ( DP , δ DP )-differentially private, and the outputs of Φ are used in a linear model by minimizing L b with a removal mechanism that is ( CR , δ CR )-CR. Then the entire procedure is ( DP + CR , δ DP +δ CR )-CR.
The advantage of this approach over training the entire network in a differentially private manner (Abadi et al., 2016) is that the linear model can be trained without differential privacy, which may greatly boost the accuracy of the final model (see Section 4.3).
EXPERIMENTS
We test our certified removal mechanism in three settings: (1) removal from a standard linear logistic regressor, (2) removal from a linear logistic regressor that uses a feature extractor pre-trained on public data, and (3) removal from a non-linear logistic regressor by using a differentially private feature extractor. A summary of all (re-)training and removal times measured in our experiments is presented in Table 1 .
Linear Logistic Regression
We first present experiments on the MNIST digit classification dataset. To simplify the setup, we restrict to the binary classification problem of distinguishing between digits 3 and 8, and train an L 2 -regularized logistic regressor using Algorithm 1. In all cases, the Newton update is several orders of magnitude more efficient than re-training from scratch. Training a regular model for optimal accuracy is sometimes more expensive than re-training the removal-enabled model due to having a smaller λ, which impacts convergence. Effect of L 2 -regularization parameter, λ, and standard deviation of the objective perturbation, σ, on: test accuracy (left) and supported number of removals before re-training is required at = 1 (middle); and trade-off between accuracy and supported number of removals at = 1 (right). Higher λ and σ values reduce test accuracy but allow for many more removals.
Effects
parameters: the L 2 -regularization parameter, λ, and the standard deviation, σ, of the sampled perturbation vector b. Figure 1 shows the effect of λ and σ on test accuracy and the expected number of removals supported before re-training. Increasing λ and σ always enable more removals before re-training (middle plot): higher λ reduces H −1 w * ∆ 2 , whereas σ has a direct scaling effect on the number of removals allowed due to line 15 of Algorithm 2. However, excessively high values of σ and λ also have an adverse effect on test accuracy since the perturbation and regularization terms can dominate the loss (left and right plots).
Tightness of the bounds on gradient residual. Theorems 1 and 3 show the asymptotic behavior of the gradient residual norm when increasing the size of training data. In practice, we use the data-dependent bound from Corollaries 1 and 2 to compute a per-data or per-batch estimate of the removal error, as opposed to the worst-case bound in Theorems 1 and 3. Figure 2 shows the value of different bounds as the number of removed points increases. We consider two removal scenarios: single point removal and batch removal with batch size m = 10. We can observe three phenomena: (1) The worst-case bounds (light blue and light green) are several orders of magnitude higher than the data-dependent bounds (dark blue and dark green), which means that the number of supported re-movals is several orders of magnitude higher when using the data-dependent bounds.
(2) The accumulation of gradient norm is approximately linear for both the single and batch removal data-dependent bounds. (3) There remains a large gap between the data-dependent norm bounds and the true values (dashed line), which implies the utility of our removal mechanism may be improved via tighter analysis.
Gradient residual norm and removal difficulty. The data-dependent bound is governed by the norm of the update H −1 w * ∆, which measures the influence of the removed point on the parameter and varies highly with the training point being removed. Figure 3 shows the training samples corresponding to the largest and smallest 10 computed values of H −1 w * ∆ 2 . There is a large visual difference between these samples: the top row consists of oddly-shaped 3s and 8s, while the bottom row contains visually "typical" digits. Removing outlier samples is harder, as the model tends to memorize their details and their impact on the model is easy to distinguish from other training samples.
Non-Linear Logistic Regression using
Public, Pre-Trained Feature Extractors
We consider the common scenario in which a feature extractor is trained on public data (i.e., does not require removal), and a linear classifier is trained on these features using non-public data. We study two tasks: (1) scene classification on the LSUN dataset and (2) sentiment classification on the Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST) dataset. We subsample the LSUN dataset to 100K images per class (i.e., n = 1M).
For LSUN, we extract features using a public ResNeXt-101 model (Xie et al., 2017) trained on 1B Instagram images (Mahajan et al., 2018) and fine-tuned on ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) . For SST, we extract features from a pre-trained RoBERTa language model. At removal time, we use Algorithm 2 with = 1 and δ = 1e-4 in both experiments.
Result on LSUN. We reduce the 10-way LSUN classification task to 10 one-versus-all tasks and randomly subsample the negative examples to balance the positive and negative classes. Subsampling benefits the removal procedure since a training sample does not always need to be removed from all 10 classifiers.
Figure 4 (left) shows the relationship between test accuracy and the expected number of removals on LSUN. The value of (λ, σ) is shown next to each point, with the left-most point corresponding to training a regular model that supports no removal. At the cost of a small deterioration in accuracy (from 88.6% to 83.3%), the model supports over 10, 000 removals before retraining is needed. As shown in Table 1 , the computational cost for removal is more than 250× smaller than (re-)training the model on the remaining data points.
Result on SST. SST is a sentiment classification dataset commonly used for benchmarking language models (Wang et al., 2019) . We use SST in the binary classification task of predicting whether or not a movie review is positive. Figure 4 (right) shows the trade-off between accuracy and supported number of removals. The regular model (left-most point) attains a test accuracy of 89.0%, which matches the performance of competitive prior work (Tai et al., 2015; Wieting et al., 2016; Looks et al., 2017) . As before, a large number of removals is supported at a small loss in test accuracy; the computational costs for removal are 870× lower than for re-training the model.
Non-linear regression with differentially private features
When public data is not available for training a feature extractor, we can train a differentially private feature extractor on private data and apply Theorem 4 to efficiently remove data from the final linear layer. This approach has a major advantage over training the entire model privately since the linear layer, being trained non-privately, can correct for the noisy features produced by the private feature extractor.
We evaluate this approach on the Street View House Numbers (SVHN) digit classification dataset. We compare it to a differentially private CNN 2 trained using the technique of Abadi et al. (2016) . Since the CNN is differentially private, certified removal is achieved trivially without applying any removal. For a fair comparison, we fix δ = 1e-4 and train ( DP /10, δ)private CNNs for a range of values of DP . By the union bound for group privacy (Dwork, 2011) , the resulting models support up to 10 ( DP , δ)-CR removals.
To measure the effectiveness of Theorem 4 for certified data removal, we also train an ( DP /10, δ/10)differentially private CNN and extract features from its penultimate linear. We then use these features to train 10 one-versus-all classifiers with total failure probability of at most 9 10 δ. Similar to the experiment on LSUN in Section 4.2, we subsample the negative examples in each of the binary classifiers to speed up removal. The expected contribution to from the updates is set to CR ≈ DP /10, hence achieving ( , δ)-CR with = DP + CR ≈ DP + DP /10 after 10 removals. Figure 5 shows the relationship of test accuracy on SVHN versus for both the fully private and the Newton update removal methods. The dashed line shows the accuracy attained by the same CNN architecture when trained regularly. For smaller values or , training a private feature extractor (blue) and applying the Newton update removal on the linear layer attains drastically higher test accuracy than training a fully differentially private model (orange). In particular, at ≈ 0.1, the fully differentially private baseline's accuracy is only 22.7%, whereas the certified removal Trade-off between test accuracy and the expected number of supported removals (at = 1) on LSUN (left) and SST (right). The setting of (λ, σ) is shown next to each point. The number of supported removals rapidly increases when accuracy is slightly sacrificed. method attains a test accuracy of 71.2%. Furthermore, removal from the linear model trained on top of the private extractor only takes 0.27s, compared to more than 1.5h when training the CNN from scratch.
RELATED WORK
Removal of specific training samples from models has been studied in prior work on decremental learning (Cauwenberghs and Poggio, 2000; Karasuyama and Takeuchi, 2009; Tsai et al., 2014) and machine unlearning (Cao and Yang, 2015) . Ginart et al. (2019) studied the problem of removing data from k-means clusterings. All these studies aim at exact removal of one or more training samples from a trained model: their main metric of success is closeness to the optimal parameter or objective value. This suffices for purposes such as quickly evaluating the leave-one-out error or correcting mislabeled data. However, approximating the optimal parameter or objective value is insufficient for any formal guarantee of indistinguishability. Our work leverages differential privacy to develop a more rigorous definition of data removal from models.
Our definition of certified removal uses the same notion of indistinguishability as that of differential privacy. Many classical machine learning algorithms have been shown to support differentially private versions, including PCA (Chaudhuri et al., 2012) , matrix fac-torization (Liu et al., 2015) , linear models (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) , and neural networks (Abadi et al., 2016) . We hope to further explore the connections between differential privacy and certified removal in follow-up work to design certified-removal algorithms with better guarantees and computational efficiency.
